ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT LAW ON HIGHER EDUCATION

In this analysis, only three main problems were noted—those that will most obviously and most quickly create negative consequences, and which certainly do not move in the direction of improving higher education in our country. Some of them are taken from previous versions of the Law on Higher Education, which is by no means an excuse for proposing such a legal text, which in no way contributes to improving the atmosphere and quality of higher education.

Prof. Dr. Nenad Marković

The forthcoming brief analysis of the Draft Law on Higher Education refers exclusively to the version published on 26.01.2026 on the Unified National Register of Regulations of the Republic of North Macedonia (ENER) and does not engage in commenting on any possible additional amendments or modifications that may have occurred in the period after its publication on ENER, nor on other working versions of the Draft Law. Likewise, due to the short format, the analysis does not engage in a comparison with previous versions of the Law on Higher Education and does not comment on whether certain solutions are taken from previous versions or are novelties in this Draft Law, but rather comments on and analyzes the Draft Law on Higher Education as an integral, coherent text. The analysis is largely teleological, that is, it analyzes the purpose, intent, and probable outcome of what is presented as a legal text, without delving into nomotechnical specifics. The analysis does not place its emphasis on the craftsmanship of drafting the Draft Law on Higher Education, but provides a broader, primarily political-science-based overview of the context of higher education in the state. Additionally, the broader political context influenced by this Draft Law on Higher Education is also commented on, primarily from the perspective of university autonomy but also the balance of power between the state and academia in our society.

If the integrally published text of the Draft Law on Higher Education is viewed as a whole, it can be observed that there is hardly any part of the Draft that is not problematic. However, if the problems of the Draft are grouped into several units, several significant shortcomings can be identified. In the first place is the evident undermining and грубо кршење (gross violation) of university autonomy by the executive power. The second evident problem is what can cynically be called the “geriatrization” of higher education and the discouragement of young academic staff from advancing and engaging in science and higher education at all. The third, but not final, problem is the opening of the possibility for nepotism and arbitrariness in higher education by the executive power, neglecting the interest of the academic community but also the elementary collegiality of universities and university units in the recruitment, development, and academic advancement of academic staff at all levels.

However, before entering into the very areas in which serious shortcomings are observed in the offered solutions of the Draft Law on Higher Education, it is appropriate to briefly analyze the context in which the Draft was adopted, as well as the manner in which this was done. The Draft Law on Higher Education was prepared in an extremely non-transparent atmosphere by a working group of allegedly around sixty professors, whose composition was never made public. Additionally, none of these professors dared to come forward and explain the solutions and proposals offered in this version of the Draft Law on Higher Education, nor did they assume public responsibility to confront arguments with the rest of the academic community through a process of public deliberation and a reasonable exchange of arguments. The only holder of public office who offered any kind of platform for discussion and exchange of arguments is the Minister of Education and Science, Prof. Dr. Vesna Janevska, who significantly personalized the entire process, but at least offered an opportunity for debate and substantiated criticism. What of these criticisms will be accepted and what rejected remains to be seen. On the other hand, if the text of this Draft Law on Higher Education is compared with the very similar and widely contested Law on Higher Education from 2014, a rather perfidious technique of adopting the Draft becomes evident. Namely, unlike in 2014, in this version of the Draft Law, no state exam for students is foreseen, thereby neutralizing any reaction from them to the Draft. With this, the biggest problem of the 2014 Law on Higher Education is avoided, namely, a potential student mobilization against the current Draft Law on Higher Education. Secondly, the position of already elected full professors is not called into question; on the contrary, it is guaranteed as inviolable, thereby avoiding confrontation with a large part of the academic community, shifting the entire academic burden onto younger generations, primarily assistants, assistant professors and associate professors. Although the position of full professors is certainly inviolable and not subject to any revision or retroactivity that would arise from this Draft Law on Higher Education, the affirmation of their position has a clear purpose—to “buy” the conformism and silence of a large part of the academic community.

State Control

If one proceeds with a segmented analysis of the Draft Law on Higher Education, the first topic that is the most painful and most evident in the legal text is the attempt of the state to introduce, if not complete, then fundamental and comprehensive control over higher education. This tendency is visible in the composition of the bodies responsible for the most vital issues, such as the National Council and the University Council envisaged by the Draft Law on Higher Education, where the state has either a significant share or dominance in decision-making through the nomination of members. Thus, in the National Council (Article 43), which is envisaged as the highest body in the field of higher education, out of 15 members, as many as six are nominated by the Government, six are proposed by the Inter-University Conference, one member comes from the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, one from the chambers of commerce and one member from among the student members of the Inter-University Conference. It is clear that in such a composition the state has control over at least eight members of the National Council (if the chambers of commerce and MANU are added, which with high probability will be aligned with the “state interest”), which is a majority of the members. The probability that the Government will nominate professors who are not aligned with the state interest is almost non-existent, i.e., minimal, and if to this is added the traditional submissiveness of rectorates of universities to the executive power due to financial dependence on budgetary funds, the contours of this body clearly indicate complete state control or enormous influence, at the very least. This of course depends on the integrity of the representatives of the chambers of commerce, the nominated professors from the Inter-University Conference, as well as the representative of MANU and the students.

A similar situation exists with the University Council (Article 86), where out of a total of 11 members, five members are appointed by the Senate of the university, one member is appointed by the university student assembly, four members are appointed by the Government from among associate and full professors of public universities upon proposal of the minister responsible for higher education, and one member is appointed by the Chamber of Commerce of North Macedonia. Such a composition also raises suspicion of significant state influence in this body, and the possibility of dominance through influence over members of the Chamber of Commerce and potentially over part of the professors appointed by the Senate, which is certainly not difficult given the enormous dependence of state universities on budgetary funds and the state in general. The fact that the role of the minister responsible for higher education is further strengthened with highly personalized competencies in the composition of the University Council speaks in favor of the authoritarian tone of this Draft Law on Higher Education.

The same model of state interference is observed in the Board for Trust and Cooperation with the Public (Article 107), which is granted large competencies although it is a non-academic body by its composition. Likewise, it is foreseen that representatives of the Government participate in this body, although its composition is to be regulated by the statute of the faculty or higher vocational school. What is concerning is that this Board has the obligation to give an opinion to the Senate of the university regarding a study program, and the Senate is obliged to forward this opinion to the Council for Quality in Higher Education. It is unclear what competencies this body has to give opinions on academic higher education programs (even advisory), and it also remains unclear what the consequences are in the event of a negative opinion by the Board. What is clear is that this is yet another instance of control and possible problematization of academic programs that may not be liked by any executive authority, and which can be blocked and delayed at this level as well.

Geriatrization of Higher Education

The Draft Law on Higher Education is presented as an instrument that should improve the quality of higher education and thereby retain Macedonian students at Macedonian universities, i.e. prevent the outflow of students and academic staff abroad. What the Draft Law actually offers achieves a completely opposite goal, the consequences of which may be dramatic. Namely, on the one hand, it is noticeable that the legal solutions are extremely discouraging for young researchers and academic staff who are building their careers towards permanent professorship. Article 161 of the Draft Law introduces unrealistic and highly problematic criteria for career advancement, with the favoring of only one journal database—Web of Science—whose quality is unquestionable, but which is nevertheless only one of many databases that exist and are relevant in different scientific fields, areas and disciplines. On the one hand, this is a private scientific database of journals of the company Clarivate Analytics, which in itself represents favoritism towards a private commercial entity in higher education, which is unacceptable. On the other hand, the nature of the database favors a methodology characteristic of natural sciences and often does not correspond to the needs and demands of specific social science disciplines (for example, legal sciences). Additionally, other databases that are relevant especially for social sciences, such as Scopus or EBSCO, are completely excluded, while monographs and other forms of academic publishing become worthless. In addition to the unrealistically high number of papers required for election to higher titles (assistant professor, associate professor and full professor), participation in international projects is also required, where for re-election to full professor the candidate is required to be the holder of at least three projects, which is an extremely unrealistic criterion. The introduction of the h-index (citation index) is also problematic given that this is a criterion that does not depend on the candidate and is highly dependent on the topic that a given academic engages in, as well as on the area and field of academic activity. At the same time, an approach has been chosen of introducing the same criteria for advancement in all disciplines, which, besides being extremely unrealistic and among the strictest in Europe, are completely inappropriate for most social science fields.

Without further elaboration, the question arises of the motivation for career advancement of young academic staff, who, in addition to having to meet some of the strictest criteria in Europe for election to any subsequent title, are also faced with the introduction of re-election to full professor (seven years after election), which is another tool for disciplining young academic staff and their dependence on older generations of professors for promotion. If to this is added the provision (Article 175, paragraph 13) which allows retired professors to be engaged in second-cycle studies (in addition to the already existing third cycle in which they participate), the intention of the Draft Law on Higher Education to create a complete geriatrization of higher education and not to open even minimal space for young staff becomes clear. If such unrealistic and overly strict criteria are introduced, if re-election to full professor is introduced, if a greater role is allowed for retired professors (in second and third cycles), it is clear that young and quality academic staff will seek their opportunity at universities abroad where, with much lower criteria, they will grow and develop in an academic environment that is far more developed and in countries that allocate far more serious funds for scientific research than the Republic of North Macedonia. This will certainly not enrich the supply of academic staff in the country, which in the long run will lead to an even greater outflow of students abroad in search of better education.

Nepotism and possible political influence in кадровската политика (staffing policy)

What is deeply concerning in the Draft Law on Higher Education is also the open possibility of influencing staffing policy at universities and faculties. Namely, Article 175, paragraph 2 foresees the possibility of transferring academic staff from one higher education institution to another through an agreement concluded between the two institutions and the person transferring, where the person establishes an employment relationship in the same, i.e. equivalent title. If to this is added the complete deletion of provisions from the previous Law on Higher Education that referred to nepotism and its prohibition in higher education, the intention is more than clear. Such a legal constellation enables the employment of party and politically suitable staff through the complete bypassing of the Teaching-Scientific Councils (TSC) of faculties and interventions in staffing policy by the executive power. The open possibility for nepotistic practices and political interventions by political centers of power creates concern but also anger among existing academic staff who have had to build their careers incrementally within university units, and who at the same time will neither be asked nor consulted in the hiring of new staff through agreements between two institutions, which is an extremely problematic modality, especially if it begins to be abused.

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In this brief analysis, not all problematic aspects of the Draft Law on Higher Education have been exhausted. They are, unfortunately, numerous and affect many sensitive parts of academic autonomy. The model of financing, the competences of the executive power, and especially the Minister of Education and Science, the completely unrealistic conditions for doctoral candidates and master’s students, are only part of the problematic solutions arising from the Draft Law on Higher Education. In this analysis, only three main problems were noted—those that will most obviously and most quickly create negative consequences, and which certainly do not move in the direction of improving higher education in our country. Some of them are taken from previous versions of the Law on Higher Education, which is by no means an excuse for proposing such a legal text, which in no way contributes to improving the atmosphere and quality of higher education. Instead of addressing existing legal shortcomings, they are not only carried over into the new version of the Draft Law on Higher Education but are also upgraded with even more problematic solutions, which, in the medium and long term, will lead to a deeply discouraging and destructive environment in higher education.

 

The text was prepared within the framework of the project “Advocacy for Inclusive Development,” financially supported by the Government of Switzerland through the Civica Mobilitas program. The content of this text is the sole responsibility of the Forum for Reasonable Policies, IOHN, and BIRC, and in no way can it be considered to reflect the views of the Government of Switzerland, Civica Mobilitas, or the organizations implementing it.